Shareholder Lawsuits: Where Is the Line Between Legitimate and Frivolous?
ExEcutivE compEnsation and proxy voting
Shareholders of public companies "hire" a board of directors to represent them in corporate matters because shareholders do not and cannot have sufficient information to monitor all business decisions made by executives and directors. This includes not only decisions regarding corporate strategy and operations but also the design of executive compensation contracts. Because shareholders are a heterogeneous group-with different time horizons, objectives, and levels of activity-they are likely to have conflicting opinions about how pay should be structured. Furthermore, even if shareholders could agree on a rational determination, the process of seeking their input and gaining consensus would be highly inefficient relative to the process of delegating such decisions to a board of representatives. As a result, the design of executive compensation contracts is recommended by the compensation committee of the board of directors and approved by a vote of the independent directors of the full board.
Although the board is responsible for determining executive compensation level and structure, a vote of shareholders is required under two circumstances. First, shareholders must generally approve equity-based compensation plans (such as stock option plans and restricted stock awards) because the issuance of new equity dilutes the ownership interest of existing shareholders. If an equity-compensation program is not approved, the board of directors must amend and resubmit it to shareholders. Second, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 requires that shareholders be granted an advisory vote (usually held every year) on the compensation of the CEO and other named executive officers in the annual proxy. Because such "say-on-pay" votes are By david f. larcker and Brian tayan november 27, 2012 advisory (non-binding), the board of directors is not required to make changes if the plan does not pass.
Shareholders rely on disclosure made in the annual proxy (form DEF 14A) to inform their votes. The information included in the proxy is specified by the SEC.
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Executive compensation proposals generally receive shareholder approval. Between 2001 and 2010, only 2 percent of equity-compensation plans failed to receive majority support from shareholders.
2 Similarly, in the two years since Dodd-Frank was enacted, only 1.5 percent of companies failed their say-on-pay votes.
sharEholdEr lawsuits on compEnsation
In recent years, some shareholder groups have responded to failed votes by filing lawsuits. For example, after failing to garner majority support for their advisory say-on-pay votes, shareholder groups sued Beazer, Cincinnati Bell, Citigroup, DexOne, Occidental Petroleum, and others. The suits alleged that directors breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith, and candor by granting compensation packages that were excessive, not appropriately tied to performance, and not in the interest of shareholders (see Exhibit 1). Although the majority of these cases have been dismissed, a few remain pending.
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While say-on-pay litigation following a failed vote has generally not been successful, shareholder groups have found a new approach in suing companies for inadequate disclosure. In these cases, shareholders allege that the company has provided insufficient disclosure to inform shareholders how to vote on executive compensation. Broc Romanek Because companies generally do not want to hold a shareholder vote while a lawsuit is pending that questions the reliability of the information used for that vote, they face pressure to settle to avoid postponing their annual meeting.
Given the potential payoff from this approach, some law firms have filed multiple lawsuits or launched an investigation into say-on-pay disclosure. For example, in 2012 alone, the law firm Faruqi & Faruqi has filed over 33 lawsuits for inadequate disclosure (Exhibit 2). In one such case against Microsoft, the firm alleges that the company's proxy is "materially misleading and incomplete" and that directors "violated fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, candor, and good faith… and have acted to potentially put their personal interests ahead of the interests of Microsoft shareholders" (see Exhibit 3). The lead plaintiff in the case, Natalie Gordon, is involved in similar lawsuits against Cisco Systems and Symantec, and has a long history of shareholder lawsuits against companies (see Exhibit 4).
According to a publication by DLA Piper:
The STaTe CorporaTe LaW the board has an obligation to act in the interest of the corporation and its shareholders when making corporate decisions. Under state law, this is referred to as fiduciary duty. fiduciary duty has three components:
• the duty of care requires that directors make decisions with due deliberation. even if the decision of the board turns out to be wrong, the courts will generally defer to the board's judgment so long as the company can demonstrate that the board took appropriate measures to inform itself and that it made its decision in good faith (i.e., without conflict of interest or turning a blind eye to issues within its responsibility). this is known as the business judgment rule.
• the duty of loyalty requires that directors make decisions without conflict of interest. for example, if a director discovers a business opportunity in the course of his or her service to the company, the duty of loyalty requires that the director refrain from taking the opportunity without first determining whether the company will take it.
• the duty of candor requires that management and the board inform shareholders of all information that is important to their evaluation of the company and its management.
shareholders can sue a board of directors in state court for violation of these duties, seeking damages for losses sustained as a result of the alleged violation.
FederaL SeCurITIeS LaW
federal securities laws require companies to disclose information to the public through filings with the securities and exchange commission (sec). the sec specifies in considerable detail the information that these filings must contain. a failure to comply with these rules also exposes a company to liability.
LIaBILITy in practice, directors rarely make out-of-pocket payments as a result of corporate lawsuits, because they are either indemnified by the company or covered by directors' and officers' insurance (d&o insurance) purchased by the company on their behalf. nature of the action 1. this is a shareholder class action brought by Plaintiff individually and on behalf of shareholders of Microsoft corporation ("Microsoft" or the "company") to enjoin the shareholder vote scheduled to be held at the annual meeting of Microsoft shareholders on november 28, 2012…
2. on october 9, 2012, Microsoft filed with the securities and exchange commission (the "sec") a definitive Proxy statement on schedule 14a (the "Proxy") in connection with the shareholder Vote on five proposals.
3. in the Proxy, the board of directors of Microsoft (the "Board") recommends that its shareholders approve the company's executive compensation (the "executive compensation Proposal") in Proposal 2. the Proxy, however, fails to provide adequate disclosure as to what information the Board considered in making this recommendation.
4. the Board also recommends in the Proxy that Microsoft shareholders vote to approve the employee stock Purchase Plan ("esPP"), a proposed amendment and restatement of the company's 2003 employee stock Purchase Plan which will reserve 200,000,000 shares of Microsoft common stock for issuance under the esPP (the "esPP Proposal") in Proposal 4 (together, with the executive compensation Proposal, the "Proposals"). However, the Proxy contains severe and material disclosure violations regarding the reasons for, and effects of, the esPP Proposal and why it is in the best interest of shareholders.
5. the individual defendants have violated fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, candor, and good faith owed to the public shareholders of Microsoft, and have acted to potentially put their personal interests ahead of the interests of Microsoft shareholders.
6. the dissemination of a materially misleading and incomplete Proxy in connection with the shareholder Vote on the Proposals, and the acts of the individual defendants, as more particularly alleged herein, constitute a breach of defendants' fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and the class, as well as a violation of applicable legal standards governing defendants herein. as a result, Plaintiff alleges that she, along with all other public shareholders of Microsoft common stock, is entitled to enjoin the shareholder Vote on the Proposals, unless and until defendants remedy their breaches of fiduciary duty.
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Exhibit 3 -continuEd
[allegations regarding say-on-Pay disclosure] the proxy fails to disclose the following regarding the executive compensation Proposal.
• the Proxy fails to disclose a fair summary of the advice, counsel and analyses performed and provided to the Board and/or the compensation committee by semler Brossy consulting Group, llc ("semler"), the compensation committee's compensation consultant;
• the Proxy fails to disclose how the Board's compensation committee selected semler as its independent compensation consultant in connection with determining executive compensation and the amount of fees the company paid to semler in connection with its engagement as the compensation committee's independent compensation consultant for fiscal 2012;
• While the Proxy discloses the comparable companies observed in the peer groups used by the compensation committee, it fails to disclose compensation data for the named executive officers of the peer companies, including even the median, mean, and range for the peer group data set;
• the Proxy fails to disclose (i) the base salary, (ii) annual incentive awards, (iii) long-term incentive awards, and (iv) total direct compensation data for each of the companies in the company's peer groups;
• although the Proxy discloses that the compensation committee and independent directors review an array of measures before applying their judgment to determine named executive officers' ("neo") pay, it fails to disclose how much weight the listed factors have in determining neo pay for the year; and
• While the Proxy discloses that the compensation committee, in response to certain market changes, increased target incentive Plan awards for the to the neos (Mr. delBene, 32%; Mr. klein, 58%; Mr. sinofsky, 21%; Mr. turner, 14%), it fails to provide the underlying criteria used to determine these percentages. [allegations regarding the employee stock Purchase Program] the Proxy, however, is deficient in its disclosure regarding the esPP Proposal, as follows:
• the Proxy fails to disclose the fair summary of any expert's analysis or any opinion obtained in connection with the esPP Proposal
• the Proxy fails to disclose the criteria utilized by the compensation committee and the Board to implement the esPP and why the esPP Proposal would be in the best of interest of shareholders;
• the Proxy fails to disclose the dilutive impact that issuing additional shares may have on existing shareholders; and
• the Proxy fails to disclose how the Board determined the number of additional shares requested to be authorized.
Plaintiff and the class will suffer irreparable damage unless defendants are enjoined from continuing to breach their fiduciary duties by carrying out the shareholder Vote on the Proposals without fully and accurately disclosing all information concerning the Proposals. Personal injury. "early in the morning of May 6, 2007 natalie stepped into the bathroom of her room and slipped across a wet slippery floor, and fell to the ground. While getting up she felt water dripping on her shoulder and as she looked up to discover the source of the drip she was struck by a piece of plaster that fell off the ceiling." 9/18/2008 constellation energy Group class action. Breach of fiduciary duty. individual defendants sold constellation energy Group without allowing for proper competitive bidding which, during a period of market instability, drove down constellation stock. Plaintiff and class members want the merger to be voided.
